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Abstract
Just as errors in sequential programs can lead to security
exploits, errors in concurrent programs can lead to con-
currency attacks. In this paper, we present an in-depth
study of concurrency attacks and how they may affect ex-
isting defenses. Our study yields several interesting ﬁnd-
ings. For instance, we ﬁnd that concurrency attacks can
corrupt non-pointer data, such as user identiﬁers, which
existingmemory-safetydefensescannothandle. Inspired
by our ﬁndings, we propose new defense directions and
ﬁxes to existing defenses.
1 Introduction
Two trends have caused concurrent programs to become
pervasive and critical. The ﬁrst is a hardware trend: the
rise of multicore computing [7]. For years, sequential
code enjoyed automatic speedup as computer architects
steadily made single-core multiprocessors faster. Re-
cently, however, power and wire-delay constraints [17]
have forced microprocessors into multicore designs, and
adding more cores does not automatically speed up se-
quential code.
The second trend is a software one: the coming storm
of cloud computing [8]. More and more users are going
online, requesting ever richer and more powerful—and
thus computation and data intensive—services. These
services, including many of those traditionally offered
on desktops (e.g., word processing), are now served from
distributed “clouds” of servers to meet user demands for
scalability, always-on availability, everywhere connec-
tivity, and desirable consistency. To cope with this mas-
sive workload, practically all services employ concurrent
programs to increase performance.
Unfortunately, despite our increasing reliance on con-
current programs, they remain much more difﬁcult to
write, test, and debug than sequential versions [18, 22].
This impediment has led to numerous subtle but serious
concurrency errors in many widespread concurrent pro-
grams [19]. Even as tools for sequential programs are
maturing [9, 11], concurrency errors are likely to become
the dominant type of software errors in the near future.
Just as errors in sequential programs can lead to se-
curity exploits, concurrency errors can be similarly vul-
nerable and lead to concurrency attacks. Although ini-
tial evidence has shown that concurrency attacks are fea-
sible [2], neither the research community nor industry
have studied concurrency attacks to the same extent as
sequential attacks [12, 20]. To better defend against con-
currency attacks, it is key to thoroughly understand them.
For instance, what are the characteristics of concurrency
attacks? How do they work? How do they affect tradi-
tional sequential defense mechanisms?
In this paper, we present an in-depth study of concur-
rency attacks and how they may affect existing defenses.
The raw data of our study consists of 46 potential attacks
on concurrency errors from 23 real-world programs, in-
cluding the Linux kernel, GNU Libc, and applications
such as Apache and Chrome. For each attack, we inves-
tigate its attack path, analyzing the buggy interleaving of
code, identifying data that is corrupted or inconsistently
exposed, and categorizing the actual impact such as ar-
bitrary code execution. We also investigate the effective-
ness of existing defenses against these attacks.
Our study yields several interesting ﬁndings. For in-
stance, we ﬁnd that many concurrency errors compro-
mise memory safety and can be exploited the same way
as sequential errors. Thus, existing memory safety tech-
niques, once made aware of concurrency, can defend
against these attacks. However, some concurrency errors
can corrupt non-pointer data, such as user identiﬁers or
authentication ﬂags, which existing memory-safety de-
fenses cannot handle. We also analyze many existing de-
fenses and identify common weaknesses caused by con-
currency errors, and propose new defense directions and
ﬁxes to some of these weaknesses.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, to
the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to systemat-
ically study concurrency attacks and their implications
for existing defenses. Second, the paper outlines sev-
eral open research challenges in the defense of these at-
tacks as well as new defense directions. We hope our
initial work will motivate fellow researchers to work on
addressing concurrency attacks. Lastly, we will release
our study results including the automated attack scripts
we construct as “concurrency attack specimens” to the
research community.
This paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst describe
our study methodology in (§2). We then describe our
ﬁndings on concurrency attacks (§3) and existing defense
techniques (§4). We then propose new defense directions
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Figure 1: Concurrency attack paths.
(§5). Finally, we discuss related work (§6).
2 Study Methodology
2.1 Attacks
Our study consists of 46 potential concurrency attacks.
To collect this data, we examined three sources of vul-
nerabilities: (1) the Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sures (CVE) database [2], (2) real concurrency errors
extensively studied in previous work [19], and (3) the
bug databases of real open-source software. From these
sources, we included only concurrency errors that are
(potentially) exploitable and have detailed description,
such as a well-written report of the error, sample exploit
code, or a source patch. We then carefully inspected
these materials to understand the root cause of the er-
rors and how they may be exploited. The raw data of the
errors is available online [2].
The errors in our dataset range across ﬁve main OS
environments, including Windows, MacOS X, Linux,
iPhone OS, and CISCO IOS. These errors are from a di-
verse set of 23 real-world programs, including kernels
such as the Linux kernel, system libraries such as GNU
Libc, and user-space programs such as KDE, Apache,
and Chrome. We hope this diversity increases the cover-
age and value of our dataset.
When studying the concurrency attacks, we classify
them based on their attack paths, which have the form
“interleaving → data → impact.” Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne
a taxonomy as in Figure 1 with the following semantics:
• Interleaving: the origin of a concurrency attack,
namely, the buggy interleaving of code execution
that makes the attack possible. For instance, the in-
terleaving may violate atomicity (multiple memory
accesses must occur atomically) or execution order
(multiple memory accesses must occur in a ﬁxed or-
der) constraints.
• Data: the intermediate effects of a concurrency at-
tack, namely, what data the attack corrupts.1 There
may be one or more data steps in a concurrency at-
tack. For instance, once a pointer is corrupted, a
store instruction via this pointer can further cor-
rupt other program data.
1Sometimes an attack does not literally corrupt data; instead, it
causes some code to read inconsistent data. For brevity, we broadly
deﬁne these effects as corrupting data.
• Impact: the results of a concurrency attack, such
as denial of service via program crashes, code in-
jection, or privilege escalation. An attack may have
more than one results: for instance, once an attacker
can run arbitrary code, she can easily escalate her
privilege set.
A previous study [19] investigated interleaving pat-
terns in depth. Our dataset differs from the dataset used
in the previous study in three ways: (1) some errors
in our dataset come from programs communicating by
passing messages; (2) some errors are in the kernel or
user-space libraries; and (3) our focus is on exploits not
just any bugs. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that the patterns of
the interleavings in our dataset match those previously
observed. Thus, we do not discuss the interleaving pat-
terns further.
Our key questions of the attack study are therefore
• Which data is corrupted or inconsistently read,
pointer data or scalar data (i.e., non-pointer data)?
• How are the concurrency errors exploited?
2.2 Defense Techniques
An important goal of our study is to analyze the ef-
ﬁcacy of existing defense techniques against concur-
rency attacks. These techniques operate at different
steps along an attack path, some of which operate at
more than one steps. For instance, memory safety tech-
niques(e.g.,[21]), StackGuard[14], andPointGuard[15]
prevent memory corruption at the data step. Address
Space Randomization (ASR) [10] makes it harder to
exploit memory corruptions. Anomaly detection tech-
niques (e.g., [16]) look for abnormal system behaviors
along all steps of an attack path.
Our key questions of the defense analysis are
1. What defense techniques still work and what are
weakened by concurrency attacks?
2. How do we strengthen the weakened defense tech-
niques?
When doing this analysis, we consider conceptual at-
tacks because the real concurrency attacks in our dataset
target speciﬁc vulnerabilities in programs, not defense
techniques, presumably because few defense techniques
have gained popularity.
2.3 Caveat
The main caveat to keep in mind with our results is that,
asinpreviousempiricalstudies, ourdatasetdoesnotcon-
tain the universe of all concurrency attacks, nor is it a
uniform sample of the universal set. Thus, it is unknown
whetherourdatasetisrepresentative. Weattempttocom-
pensate for this issue by collecting concurrency attacks
from multiple sources and from various real-world pro-
grams that spread across the kernel, libraries, and differ-
ent types of user-space applications.
2Findings Implications
A majority (24 out of 46) of the concurrency attacks corrupt
pointer data.
Existing memory safety tools, once made aware of concur-
rency, may be able to prevent concurrency attacks that cor-
rupt pointer data.
9 concurrency attacks directly corrupt scalar data, such as
user identiﬁers, without compromising memory safety.
Few existing defenses handle attacks that directly corrupt
scalar data.
Many existing defenses become unsafe in the face of concur-
rency errors
These defenses must consider concurrent execution.
The exploitability of a concurrency error highly depends on
the duration of its vulnerable window (i.e., the timing win-
dow within which the concurrency error may occur).
New defense techniques may reduce the exploitability of
concurrency errors by reducing the duration of the vulner-
able window.
Table 1: Summary of Findings.
2.4 Summary of Key Findings
We summarize the key ﬁndings from our study in Ta-
ble 1. In the next two sections (§3 and §4), we provide
more detailed explanations, as well as real examples, of
these ﬁndings.
3 Findings on Concurrency Attacks
In this section, we present our ﬁndings on concurrency
attacks, focusing on the data step (§3.1) and the impact
step (§3.2) along the attack paths.
3.1 Data
In our dataset, 13 out of 46 concurrency errors lead to
ﬁle corruption, and the other 35 errors corrupt program
data. Since previous work has studied ﬁle system Time-
of-Check-to-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) races in detail, in
this paper we focus on program data.
We further distinguish program data into pointer data
and scalar data. We deﬁne pointer data as data that, once
corrupted, compromises memory safety. For instance,
regular pointers or array indexes are pointer data. We
deﬁne scalar data as all other program data. We distin-
guish these two types of data because pointer data cor-
ruption can largely be exploited the same way for both
concurrency and sequential attacks, whereas scalar data
corruption is unique to concurrency attacks.
Of the 35 concurrency errors that corrupt program
data, 24 involve pointer data and the other 9 involve
scalar data. Figure 2 shows an example concurrency er-
ror that corrupts pointer data in the Linux kernel. This
violation is quite serious: a working exploit of this viola-
tion enables a local user to gain root access or execute ar-
bitrary code within ring 0 [3]. Speciﬁcally, this violation
occurs as follows. To load a shared library in ELF for-
mat, aprocessissuessystemcalluselib(), whichsub-
sequently calls function load elf binary() (Fig-
ure 2). This function correctly holds the semaphore
mmap sem the ﬁrst time it modiﬁes the current process’s
memory map structures (line 2–4). However, when it
1 : load elf library(...) {
2 : down write(&current−>mm−>mmap sem);
3 : error = do map(...); // CORRECT
4 : up write(&current−>mm−>mmap sem);
5 : ...
6 : if(bss > len)
7 : do brk(...);
8 : }
9 : do brk(...) {
10: vma = kmem cache alloc(...);
11: ... // initialize vma
12: // ERROR! modify mmap without holding mmap sem
13: vma link(mm, vma, ...); // link vma onto mm
14: }
15:
Figure 2: Linux kernel memory map corruption.
modiﬁes these data structures the second time by calling
do brk() (line 7), it does not hold the right semaphore.
Thus, another thread in the same process may be modi-
fying the memory map structures concurrently while this
do brk() call is running, causing kernel memory cor-
ruption.
Figure3showsaconcurrency errorthatcorruptsscalar
data, in particular user identities, and allows privilege es-
calation attacks. This bug is caused by Glibc’s default
thread library, nptl, not handling setuid() atomi-
cally. In Linux, each kernel thread has its own set of
user identities (user ID, effective user ID, etc). How-
ever, POSIXstandardsrequirethatallotherthreadsinthe
same process have identical user identities. Thus, when
one thread calls setuid(), nptl has to ensure that all
threads in the current process call setuid(). It does so
using function nptl setxid() in Figure 3, which
iterates through a list of all threads and signals each
thread to call setuid() (line 6–12). However, this
function releases the lock stack cache lock pro-
tecting the thread list, before it waits for all threads to
ﬁnish setting their identiﬁers. A new thread may be
created, and still have the old user identiﬁers. Since
31 : nptl setxid (struct xid command *cmdp)
2 : {
3 : lll lock (stack cache lock);
4 : // signal all threads on list to set user id.
5 : // a thread is represented as a stack
6 : list for each (runp, &stack used)
7 : {
8 : struct pthread *t = list entry (runp, struct pthread, list);
9 : if (t == self)
10: continue;
11: setxid signal thread (cmdp, t);
12: }
13: lll unlock (stack cache lock);
14: // ERROR: does not wait for other threads to acknowledge
15: }
16: allocate stack(...) { // called when a new thread is created
17: lll lock (stack cache lock);
18: list add (&pd−>list, &stack used);
19: lll unlock (stack cache lock);
20: }
Figure 3: Glibc setuid race.
1 : bool FastCopy (MonoArray *src, MonoArray* dest, int length){
2 : // Checks that the type of dst[i] derive from src[i]
3 : for (i = 0; i < length; ++i)
4 : if(!safe cast(type of(src[i]), type of(dest[i])))
5 : return FALSE;
6 :
7 : //ERROR: another thread might run
8 : // dst[0] = object with incompatible type;
9 :
10: // directly copy the bytes with memcpy()
11: for (i = 0; i < length; ++i)
12: memcpy(dest[i], src[i], size of(ObjPtr));
13: return TRUE;
14: }
15:
Figure 4: Moonlight fast array copy race.
setuid() is often called to drop privileges, a thread
skipping setuid() can thus result in privilege escala-
tion.
Figure 4 shows an atomicity error which allows an at-
tacker to silently violate type safety in Moonlight, the
Mono implementation of the Silverlight browser plugin.
Tospeedupanarraycopying process, theFastCopy()
method in the Mono CLR ﬁrst checks that the types of
the destination element and the source element are com-
patible (line 3–5) and, if so, performs a fast element-wise
memcpy() instead of a slow copy implemented as CLR
instructions. However, the type check and the copy are
not implemented as one atomic step, allowing an attacker
to change the destination array after the type check, com-
promising type safety. For instance, the attacker can cre-
ate a new type with the same ﬁeld layout, except that all
ﬁelds in this new type are public, thus gaining access
to the private ﬁelds in the original object.
3.2 Impact
Once a concurrency error corrupts pointer data and com-
promises memory safety, an attacker can exploit the cor-
ruption by leveraging the same techniques for sequen-
tial errors, such as launching denial of service (DoS) by
crashing the program, injecting code, or escalating privi-
leges. Oneexampleisthekernelmemorymapcorruption
in Figure 2. Another example is the MSIE R6025 ex-
ploit [1] which allows an attacker to launch a code injec-
tion attack to Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) through a
malicious webpage. Speciﬁcally, when IE opens the ma-
licious page in multiple windows, the javascript code in
the page calls the appendChild() method to append
a DHTML element of one window to an element of an-
other. A race in appendChild() can corrupt a func-
tion pointer in the heap. To reliably exploit this function
pointer corruption, the attacker sprays the heap by re-
peatedly invoking the DHTML createComments()
function, before calling appendChild().
A concurrency error can also corrupt scalar data with-
outcompromisingmemorysafety. Atabasiclevel, scalar
data corruption compromises data integrity. Worse, by
exploiting scalar data corruption, an attacker can often
launch privilege escalation attacks. All the studied con-
currency errors of this kind, including the two examples
(Figure4andFigure3)showninprevioussection, enable
privilege escalation attacks.
In our analysis, we also ﬁnd that the exploitability
of a concurrency error heavily depends on the duration
of its vulnerable window, the timing window in which
the concurrency error may occur. The concurrency er-
rors presented so far have vulnerable windows measured
in quanta of memory access time. The moonlight er-
ror in Figure 4 is particularly dangerous because an at-
tacker can enlarge the vulnerability window of the er-
ror by copying a large array and increasing the num-
ber of iterations of the type check loop (line 3–5). The
ﬁle system TOCTOU races often have vulnerability win-
dows measured in quanta of disk access time. Our study
also reveals physical proximate attacks, a unique class
of attacks carried out in human-time. Such attacks typi-
cally exploit concurrency errors in the user interface (UI)
logic.
For instance, there have been several demonstrated
vulnerabilities in the UI logic of Apple’s iOS that allow
attackers to bypass the passcode protection screen by ex-
ecuting a timed sequence of physical actions. Consider
the latest vulnerability in iOS version 4. When presented
with a passcode screen, an attacker can hit the “Emer-
gency Call” button, enter a malformed phone number
such as “###”, and then quickly hit the screen lock but-
ton to bypass the passcode screen. Several other physical
proximity attacks which exploit race-condition vulnera-
bilities within GUI’s have been identiﬁed [4–6].
4// thread t1 thread t2
taint[x] = taint[bad];
taint[x] = taint[good];
x = good;
x = bad;
Figure 5: Data race renders taint tracking unsafe.
The apparent tri-modal distribution of the duration of
vulnerable window of analyzed attacks suggests that this
feature may be used to identify the general type of con-
currency vulnerability. Furthermore, since such attacks
tend to be highly time-sensitive, the expected duration
of the vulnerable window within any region of a vul-
nerable program may be used to improve the efﬁcacy of
randomization-based defenses against these attacks.
4 Findings on Defense Techniques
As discussed in previous section, many concurrency er-
rors can be exploited in the same ways as sequential er-
rors. It is thus key to understand (1) which defense tech-
niques are effective against concurrency attacks and (2)
for those that are ineffective, how to ﬁx them.
In this section, we attempt to answer these questions
by analyzing a plethora of defense techniques from the
rich research literature. Speciﬁcally, we extract ﬁve com-
mon mechanisms that underlie many defense techniques
such as memory safety tools, taint trackers, and intrusion
detection systems. For each mechanism, we analyze how
it is affected by concurrency.
Metadata tracking. Techniques such as taint track-
ing or memory safety enforcement track program data
with metadata, such as taint tags or array bounds. If the
tracked program has a data race, the race may manifest
on the metadata owned by the defense technique, render-
ing it unsafe. Figure 5 illustrates this problem using a
contrived example. The original code has a race on vari-
able x: thread t1 assigns a tainted bad value to x and
thread t2 assigns a untainted good value to x. The in-
terleaving in the ﬁgure can cause the taint tag of x to be
inconsistent with the value of x. That is, at the end of the
execution, the tag of x indicates that x is untainted, but
the value of x is bad.
Software checks. Many techniques rely on software
checks to validate untrusted data. For instance, a taint
tracker checks that a piece of data is untainted before us-
ing it in a dangerous operation; a memory safety tool
checks that a pointer is within bounds before deferenc-
ing it; and a type checker ensures type safety (such the
fast copy type check in Figure 4). These techniques, if
unaware of concurrency, are prone to TOCTOU attacks
if the check and the use are not made atomic against con-
currently running code. Software checks on stack data
are typically not affected by concurrency errors because
stack data is rarely shared.
Static analysis. Static bug detectors have been very
effective at ﬁnding sequential errors. In addition, tech-
niques such as memory safety enforcement often rely
on sophisticated static analysis to identify places where
bounds checking is unnecessary. However, static analy-
sis for concurrent programs tend to be very inaccurate.
Thus, it is unlikely we will get precise static bug detec-
tors or other analysis tools for concurrent programs.
Anomaly detection. Typical anomaly detection sys-
tems work by learning normal program behaviors, then
detect deviations from the learned behaviors. Compli-
cations arise at both steps for concurrency attacks. For
instance, if an anomaly detector learns behaviors only
with respect to a single thread in a multithreaded system,
it may miss anomalies involving multiple threads. On
the ﬂip side, if the anomaly detector models behaviors
of all threads, the model may become overly complex
and noisy. For instance, multiple threads may issue con-
current system calls, making the n-gram model [16] too
noisy. In other words, we lack simple and accurate mod-
els for the behaviors of concurrent programs. (Content-
based anomaly detection techniques may still work.)
Hardware checks. Some techniques rely on hardware
checks. For instance, several defense techniques prevent
code injection attacks by marking pages non-executable
via the NX bit. These techniques should work in concur-
rent models because the check is performed atomically
by the hardware at the time of use.
Randomization. AddressSpaceRandomizationorin-
structionsetrandomizationworkbyhinderingtheimpact
step. They should be equally effective for both concur-
rency and sequential attacks.
To summarize, four out of the six mechanisms dis-
cussed above are weakened by concurrency. Although
ﬁxing static analysis or anomaly detection for concur-
rent programs may be difﬁcult, ﬁxing metadata track-
ing and software checks appear viable using standard ap-
proaches. Forinstance, adefensetechniquecanuselocks
to enforce the atomicity; it can also make a local copy of
a piece of shared data, then perform the check and the
use on the local data for atomicity.
5 New Defense Directions
Our study of concurrency attacks and existing defenses
inspire us to look for new, effective defense techniques.
The reasons are two-fold. First, for concurrency attacks
corrupting scalar data, we have few or no effective de-
fense techniques. Second, based on our analysis of the
wide spectrum of the exploit types of concurrency errors,
we posit that it is unlikely that a single mechanism can
defend against all types of concurrency attacks.
If we know the program location and cause of an ex-
ploitable concurrency error, we can use techniques such
as LOOM [23] to ﬁx these known vulnerabilities. How-
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Figure 6: Our study suggests a likely tri-modal distri-
bution of the duration of the vulnerable window for all
concurrency attacks.
ever, deployed concurrent programs often contain many
unknown concurrency errors because it is extremely dif-
ﬁcult to write correct concurrent programs or check
them. Thus, we focus on defense mechanisms which do
not require a priori knowledge of the existence of con-
currency errors.
Randomization techniques can often mitigate un-
known errors. For instance, address space randomiza-
tion and instruction set randomization are often the “uni-
versal last resort” to mitigate many traditional sequen-
tial attacks. We believe that we can develop similar ran-
domization techniques to defend against unknown con-
currency attacks. Speciﬁcally, we can randomize timing
to hinder an attacker from exploiting predicted duration
and timing of the vulnerability window of a concurrency
error.
Figure 6 shows a likely tri-modal distribution of the
duration of the vulnerability windows for all concur-
rency errors analyzed in our study. Intuitively, this dis-
tribution can be broken into at least three distinguishable
ranges, corresponding to concurrency errors culminating
in memory, ﬁle, and physical proximate based exploit.
Two challenging research questions arise. First, can
we develop defense mechanisms which can mitigate all
concurrency errors regardless of vulnerability window
duration? Second, given an arbitrary program, can we
identify, with some conﬁdence, the most likely type of
concurrency vulnerability to exist in a region of the pro-
gram, assuming that a vulnerability does exist?
6 Related Work
Since we have discussed related work on attacks and
defenses throughout this paper, this section focuses on
related empirical studies of software errors and attacks.
Previous work studied a large number of operating sys-
tem errors [13]. The study focuses on sequential errors
detected by an automated static analysis tool.
Chen et al. studied non-control data attacks [12], the
attacks that do not compromise control ﬂow integrity.
However, Chen’s study focused on sequential errors,
and the proposed non-control data attacks still originated
from memory corruption attacks. In contrast, our study
focuses on concurrency errors, and attacks corrupting
scalar data do not cause memory corruption at all.
Recently, Lu et al. studied many concurrency er-
rors from real software such as MySQL and Apache.
Their analysis focuses on interleaving and memory ac-
cess characteristics of concurrency errors, whereas ours
focuses on the security, exploit, and defense aspects of
the concurrency errors.
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